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Chapter Six
Social Psychology, Phenomenology,
and the Indeterminate Content of
Unreflective Racial Bias
Alex Madva
This chapter is about implicit bias. I began writing this, however, in the
United States of 2017, during a period of burgeoning explicit bigotry and
intergroup hostility. The dominant narrative surrounding implicit bias has
been aversive racism,1 according to which most Americans are sincerely
opposed to racial discrimination at the explicit level but biased at the implicit
level. What, then, to make of the resurgence of full-throated self-ascriptions
of white supremacy? Should we say, with apologies to Virginia Woolf, that
on or about November 2016, human nature changed? Or that so many of us
just got human nature completely wrong?
This chapter argues that implicit bias actually helps to explain this resur-
gence of bigotry. But properly appreciating implicit bias’s explanatory power
requires rewriting the dominant narratives about its content, conscious ac-
cessibility, and context sensitivity. One source of confusion is that “implicit”
racial bias—the construct measured with tools like the Implicit Association
Test (IAT)2—is often described as entirely unconscious. Perhaps describing
implicit bias as completely unconscious helps people to acknowledge that
they are “part of the problem” without becoming defensive. Yet the evidence
consistently suggests that individuals are aware of their implicit biases, albeit
in partial, inarticulate, or even distorted ways. These biases form part of the
“background” of social experience, exerting a pervasive influence on atten-
tion, judgment, and action, even though they are often felt without being
noticed, or noticed without being understood.3 To help make sense of these
findings, this chapter develops a thought suggested by Linda Martín Alcoff
and Gail Weiss, that implicit bias paradigmatically operates at the intermedi-
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ate level of awareness, between total nonconsciousness and articulated self-
knowledge, that has long been a central concern of the phenomenological
tradition. Implicit bias dwells in the “unthematized, taken-for-granted . . .
pre-reflective habits”4 that “structure affect, perception, and interpretation.”5
Another source of confusion is that implicit biases are often glossed as
mere associations between groups and traits, which lack intentional content.
Take the race–weapon implicit bias. Most Americans (including many
African Americans) more easily and quickly identify images of dangerous
weapons when they are paired (e.g., share the same button on the keyboard)
with black faces than with white faces. This tendency to “associate” blacks
and weapons correlates with a bias toward “shooting” unarmed black men in
a video game6 and with regional U.S. trends involving disproportionate po-
lice shootings of blacks.7 That is, in regions where participants (most of
whom are neither police officers nor victims of brutality) display stronger
black–weapon associations, unarmed black people are also more likely to be
shot by the police.8 Regional IAT data predicted these shooting disparities
more than any other tested variable, including self-reported racial attitudes
and regional levels of residential segregation, violent crime, and unemploy-
ment. Now what does it mean to interpret this race–weapon implicit bias as a
mere contentless association? It is, for one thing, to deny that individuals
who demonstrate this bias tend to believe, either consciously or unconscious-
ly, that blacks are more likely to carry weapons. The idea instead is that these
individuals simply associate “black” and “weapon” in much the same way
that they associate “salt” and “pepper” or “doctor” and “nurse”: thoughts of
one activate thoughts of the other.
This chapter argues that implicit biases are neither mere associations nor
fully articulated, propositionally structured beliefs or emotions. 9 Implicit bi-
ases are contentful—they take the world to be a certain way—but, in paradig-
matic cases, their content is indeterminate. I defend content indeterminism
about implicit bias in the metaphysical (rather than epistemic; see below)
sense. For example, when a white person experiences a “gut feeling” of
discomfort during an interaction with a black person, there is a question
about the meaning or nature of that discomfort. Is it a fear of black people? Is
it mere anxiety about appearing racist? There is, I’ll argue, no general, deter-
minate answer. The contents of our unreflective racial attitudes are funda-
mentally vague and open-ended, although they take on particular shapes and
implications—that is, they become determinate—depending on contextual
features including character traits, background assumptions, and structural
power relations. In other words, they are indeterminate when interpreted
individualistically, in isolation from context, but determinate (or at least less
indeterminate) when understood holistically and relationally, as part of
broader cognitive-bodily-social-environmental systems.10
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Unreflective Racial Bias 89
In addition to the specific theses defended, I hope to offer a case study in
bridging diverse approaches to race and racism. First, we must merge indi-
vidualistic and structural perspectives.11 Understanding individuals’ racial
attitudes requires situating those individuals in broader social contexts; con-
versely, understanding racially oppressive structures—and envisioning
emancipatory alternatives—requires populating those structures with embod-
ied, biased minds. Second, following the twentieth-century phenomenolo-
gists who integrated ongoing social-scientific developments with the philoso-
phy of lived experience, I hope to spur greater cross talk between psycholo-
gists and phenomenologists studying race. My sense is that some phenome-
nologists have been unduly dismissive of implicit bias research, raising criti-
cisms more aptly directed at popularized depictions of the research than at in-
the-weeds empirical developments.12 Conversely, many psychologists (and
the philosophers under their influence) are too quick to infer, from various
specific findings that upend specific “commonsense” assumptions about ex-
perience, that phenomenological investigation is altogether wrongheaded. To
the contrary, phenomenologists of race may have much to offer social
psychologists, both in assisting theoretical interpretations and identifying
underexplored directions for research.
The roadmap is as follows. In the first section, I say a bit about the
phenomenology of indeterminacy. In section two, I make the case that im-
plicit bias has indeterminate content. In section three, I draw out further
implications of my argument, rejecting more radically constructionist and
existentialist approaches and defending an enriched understanding of per-
son–situation relations. In the final section, I consider two alternative views.
PRIMER ON PHENOMENOLOGICAL INDETERMINACY
Maurice Merleau-Ponty argues that all experience is shot through with inde-
terminacy. Indeterminacy is, for him, not an epistemic flaw or practical limi-
tation in our relation to the world, but a fundamental condition underlying
our basic abilities to know and navigate physical and social environments.
“We must recognize the indeterminate as a positive phenomenon,” he writes;
we must identify and understand “the presence in the perceived of a positive
indeterminacy.”13
What kind of indeterminacy is Merleau-Ponty interested in? What makes
it positive? He is focused on a range of fleeting experiences that we encoun-
ter in everyday contexts, such as difficult-to-make-out street signs or scrib-
blings on a blackboard. When a sighted person, in her ordinary comings and
goings, comes across such indeterminate-looking percepts, her experience
often has an affective and action-oriented character: their blurriness presents
itself as a problem for her to solve. These “vague something-or-others . . .
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invite further exploration,”14 perhaps compelling her to lean forward or ap-
proach the something-or-others to see them more clearly, or at least to squint
or tilt her head to ease the felt sense of tension induced by the indeterminacy.
Some of the most easily replicable and shareable experiences of indetermina-
cy may be auditory, such as the shared difficulty we have in hearing song
lyrics. There is, for example, an infamous line in Aretha Franklin’s rendering
of “Respect” that is persistently difficult to make out.
What makes this indeterminacy “positive”? First, these experiences of
indeterminacy are functional and norm sensitive: they induce a sense of
unease that motivates certain behavioral responses, as when we tilt our ears
to the speaker, reach to turn up the volume, or briefly stop singing along to
listen more attentively. It is because the lyric is perceived indeterminately
that we feel compelled to discover its determinate properties. In short, the
experience of indeterminacy motivates us to make matters more determinate,
to get a better epistemic and practical grasp on our environment. Merleau-
Ponty thus writes that “a sensible that is about to be sensed poses to my body
a sort of confused problem. I must find the attitude that will provide it with
the means to become determinate. . . . I must find the response to a properly
formulated question.”15
Moreover, in paradigm cases, we must bring to bear a range of perceptual,
bodily, and cognitive skills in order to resolve the indeterminacy. The transi-
tion from vague something-or-other to determinate perception is not a pas-
sive process that just happens to us but a cognitive-affective-behavioral ac-
complishment. It is also typically a social accomplishment. Many indetermi-
nacy-resolving skills are learned via interaction with others, and many inde-
terminacies are resolved collaboratively, as when we pause the conversation
during a song’s chorus in order to collectively discern the garbled lyrics.
Consider also how drivers are more likely to get in accidents when they talk
on the phone (even if they are using hands-free devices to communicate) than
when they talk to a passenger, because passengers and drivers jointly attend
to the road.16 Situational awareness and indeterminacy resolution are often
socially shared. We collaborate to disambiguate.
According to Merleau-Ponty, the structures of perceptual indeterminacy,
and indeterminacy resolution, resemble the figure–ground structure of pic-
tures. As countless perceptual illusions demonstrate, our perception of the
figure (the foregrounded point of focus) is shaped by the background against
which it is situated. Taken in isolation, the figure may be ambiguous, but the
cues surrounding it, together with our skills for understanding those cues,
guide us to perceive the figure in determinate ways. Two papers on the
interlinked perception of race and emotion exemplify this figure–ground
structure nicely.17 In the first, participants were more likely to identify am-
biguous emotional expressions as angry if they belonged to a black face, but
happy if they belonged to a white face. Here the figure (the foregrounded
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Unreflective Racial Bias 91
problem to solve) was the emotion being expressed, while the ground (the
context covertly guiding judgments about the figure) was constituted, in part,
by perceptions of race. In the second paper, figure and ground were reversed:
participants were now more likely to identify racially ambiguous faces as
black when the faces looked angry, but white when they looked happy. In
both cases, racial biases in perceptual judgment were predicted by partici-
pants’ performance on the IAT (but not by their self-reported racial atti-
tudes). Implicit bias, in other words, was also part of the background, shad-
ing interpretations about otherwise indeterminate objects of attention. Nor is
the indeterminacy-resolving power of implicit bias restricted to split-second
judgments. Implicit bias also affects reflective deliberation, leading, for ex-
ample, mock jurors to judge that ambiguous evidence is more incriminating
when defendants are dark skinned.18 Implicit biases thus figure among the set
of “skills” we develop for drawing on contextual cues to resolve indetermina-
cies. I put “skills” in scare quotes because, although these dispositions are
socially learned, they are obviously (and sometimes tragically) biased and
misleading.
Phenomenologists use the notion of horizon to characterize these features
of experience. There are distinct (but related) uses of this idea, two of which
are relevant here. Loosely following Husserl,19 we can call the first the
internal horizon, to refer to the range of possible interpretations of a particu-
lar percept, with some more central and intuitive, others somewhat strained
but still in the ballpark, and still others decisively out of bounds. (Consider
trying to identify a blurry letter on an optometrist’s chart; perhaps it looks
most like a P, but it might be an F, and it’s definitely not an E or a Z.) Call the
second the external horizon, referring to the broader context or field within
which each particular percept is experienced, including other percepts as well
as background expectations, bodily postures, moods, and so on. Internal
horizons refer to particular entities, that is, the range of possible interpretive
options of a given percept, while external horizons refer to the context mak-
ing particular interpretive options more or less salient and determinate.
Heidegger and Gadamer invoke interpretive horizons to understand not
just perception but also our relationships to texts and art, and Alcoff appeals
to interpretive horizons to understand visible social identities like race. She
writes, “The concept of horizon helps to capture the background, framing
assumptions we bring with us to perception and understanding, the congealed
experiences that become premises by which we strive to make sense of the
world, the range of concepts and categories of description that we have at our
disposal.”20 Alcoff’s view accounts for the open-endedness and freedom
involved in self-interpretations of identity, while at the same time explaining
how this range of plausible self-interpretations is constrained by experience,
embodiment, and social relations. For example, I (a white American) can
understand my social identity as a symbol of supremacy and power, as a
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source of guilt or privilege, as a descendant of immigrants from diverse
national origins, and in numerous other ways. But I cannot, at least in current
sociopolitical circumstances, understand myself as black; that option is out of
bounds. Racially mixed individuals may understand themselves, and be per-
ceived by others, as nonwhite in some contexts and white in others. There is,
according to Alcoff, an “indeterminacy of racial categories,”21 comparable in
broad but important strokes to the indeterminacies of perceptual experience
and textual interpretation.
I claim the same applies to the experiential contents of our implicit biases:
they have an indeterminate character. As Lee, Lindquist, and Payne put it,
“implicit affect toward outgroups serves as an ambiguous signal that is avail-
able to be conceptualized as different discrete emotions based on the con-
text.”22 Implicit bias exists in a holistic relationship with a range of other
factors, any of which may, when taken in isolation, be indeterminate—nei-
ther white nor black, neither angry nor happy, and neither biased nor un-
biased—but each of which can become determinate in context, via relations
to the others.
IMPLICIT BIAS FROM BACKGROUND TO FOREGROUND
One of the most prominent debates about implicit bias in social psychology
and philosophy has been about cognitive structure. On the received view,
implicit biases are stored in long-term memory in a network of semantic
associations. Part of what inspired and sustains this view is that leading
measures of implicit bias are associative in nature. They assess, in various
ways, how quickly or likely participants are to pair stimuli, such as images of
racially typical faces with images of weapons. In recent years, however, an
alternative interpretation has gained ground, that implicit biases are lan-
guage-like, propositional structures, which can update swiftly in light of the
evidence. This propositional interpretation has been buoyed by a raft of
studies demonstrating, for example, that an isolated piece of relevant infor-
mation is sometimes sufficient to shift individuals’ performance on implicit
measures, in patterns consistent with the rational revision of belief but harder
to square with the intensive reconditioning presumably required for rewiring
ingrained associations.23
Phenomenologists may recognize in this debate the echoes of traditional
disputes between empiricism or behaviorism on the one hand and rational-
ism, intellectualism, or cognitivism on the other. Thinkers such as Merleau-
Ponty sought to transcend these disputes, emphasizing each approach’s in-
sights and oversights. We find ourselves similarly poised with respect to
implicit bias. Propositionalists are right that there must be more to implicit
biases than mere associations between concepts. Something more substantive
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Unreflective Racial Bias 93
must be said about the intentional relations in which the concepts stand. For
example, a black–weapons association on the IAT might reflect the belief,
perhaps unconscious, that blacks are violent, but couldn’t it equally well
reflect the (justified and true) belief that blacks are more likely to be stereo-
typed as violent, or indeed that blacks are more likely to be victims of weap-
on-related violence? The sheer fact of the association doesn’t distinguish
between these interpretations. So if the association were the only evidence
we had, we could not say that it amounted to bias against blacks rather than,
say, an acute acquaintance with the realities of black oppression. As it hap-
pens, of course, the association is not the only evidence we have. Myriad
studies correlate performance on these associative measures with discrimina-
tory behavior. Even the most clamorous critics of the race IAT grant that it
predicts behavior and is at worst comparable in average predictive power to
more traditional self-report measures.24 But once we have evidence tying
implicit measures to behavior, we also have evidence that the intentional
contents of implicit biases are more than mere associations. The evidence
that a black–weapon association predicts a bias toward shooting unarmed
black people is also evidence that this association is more closely tied to a
racial attitude along the lines of black people are threatening than black
people are threatened.
Yet propositionalists take this insight too far and overestimate implicit
bias’s determinacy. The full range of behavior predicted by implicit bias is
surprisingly broad and mercurial, much more so than in the case of proposi-
tional attitudes like belief and desire (at least as they are traditionally under-
stood). In some conditions, an ostensibly “biased” IAT score correlates with
prosocial and arguably ethical, rather than discriminatory, behavior. The as-
sociative approach is therefore right to suggest that the relations between
concepts are open-ended but wrong to leave them too open-ended, as if
implicit biases were altogether devoid of intentional content. By contrast, the
propositional approach is right that implicit biases are contentful but wrong
to portray their contents as more precise than they actually are.
The most tried-and-true method for knowing the contents of people’s
minds (what they want, believe, etc.) is to ask them. Individuals who sincere-
ly believe that P will be disposed to assert that P when asked (other things
equal and in appropriate conditions, e.g., when they want to tell the truth).
This strategy might seem unavailable for implicit biases because they are
often glossed as opaque to introspection. Yet it has been relatively clear for
some time that implicit biases are conscious—or at least no less conscious
than so-called explicit attitudes. Leading theorists in both the associative and
propositional camps argue that conscious awareness has numerous roles to
play in a full accounting of the causes, effects, and nature of implicit bias.
How, then, to distinguish explicit from implicit? One influential theory dis-
tinguishes between propositional and associative processes, rather than con-
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scious and unconscious representations.25 This theory describes the outputs
of associative processes as spontaneous “affective reactions” to stimuli or,
more colloquially, as “gut feelings,” which are qualitatively felt, as in the
immediate sense of discomfort a white person might feel during an interra-
cial encounter. The tendency for race-related gut feelings to go unreported
does not reflect their being unconscious, unintentional, or automatic. Rather,
whether they are reported depends on how they are interpreted in a given
context, which in turn depends on a host of further facts about the interpret-
er. Here propositional (i.e., reflective, inferential) processes enter the scene.
On this view, when people with negatively valenced spontaneous reac-
tions toward blacks are asked about their attitudes, they will, holding all else
equal, say something along the lines of, “I dislike black people” or “Blacks
are unpleasant.” Most six-year-old children, for example, readily report ra-
cial preferences, while ten-year-olds are less likely to do so, and adults are
much less likely still.26 Why do people become less likely to report racial
biases as they age? Research suggests that adults’ willingness to report their
spontaneous reactions depends in part on their other beliefs and values—that
is, their interpretive horizons. People who recognize that “Black people rep-
resent a disadvantaged minority group” and that “negative evaluations of
disadvantaged minority groups are wrong” will infer upon reflection that
negative evaluations of black people are wrong—unjustified, inaccurate, or
immoral.27 This means that their own spontaneous negative reactions are
wrong, and many individuals resolve the perceived inconsistency (cognitive
dissonance) between their biased feelings and egalitarian commitments by
reporting that they like blacks and nonblacks equally. Note that this “failure”
to self-report racial preferences need not involve intentional misreporting or
self-deception. They may be pristinely aware of the prima facie problematic
implications of their gut feelings, yet sincerely reject those feelings on the
grounds that they do not represent their considered opinion, much as some-
one can be aware of their phobic or superstitious impulses but recognize that
they are not all-things-considered justified. Thus, when given the opportunity
to separately report both their “gut feelings” and their “actual feelings,”
participants’ self-reported gut feelings correlate more strongly with implicit
than explicit measures.28
By contrast, “old-fashioned” supremacists, who believe that negative
evaluations of low-status racial minorities are entirely appropriate (e.g., be-
cause they believe racial minorities are actually inferior or are otherwise
threats to their way of life), generally do not hesitate to say so. Such individ-
uals have, in effect, a direct line of communication between their immediate
affective dispositions and their explicit reports. Similarly, more “modern”
racists—who nominally accept that negativity toward the disadvantaged is
wrong but who deny, as a factual matter, that blacks continue to be disadvan-
taged—are also more open about their negative feelings. These individuals
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Unreflective Racial Bias 95
might attribute the low social status of many African Americans to proble-
matic aspects of their “culture” or “values” or to faulty “personal choices”
rather than to oppression. Perceiving blacks as responsible for their own
hardships is then taken to license explicit negative evaluations, such as blame
or condescension. In sum, individuals who don’t believe, or simply don’t
care, that blacks continue to be oppressed will be more likely to report than
disavow their gut feelings. Only those who both endorse antiracist values and
believe in the persistence of racial oppression will refrain from reporting
negative racial sentiments.
Now is as good a time as any to note that such findings have straightfor-
ward implications for meta-analyses on the correlations between implicit and
explicit measures of bias, and between either measure and “real world” be-
havior.29 Whether people report their biases, or act on them, depends funda-
mentally on how those biases interact with other psychological and contextu-
al factors. Ignoring such factors would be analogous to running a meta-
analysis of studies examining whether striking a match leads it to catch fire
without keeping track of whether, in the preponderance of experiments, there
was any oxygen in the room or the matches were soaking wet. There is no
“pure” correlation to expect between match striking and match lighting with-
out accounting for such unassailably essential background conditions. Meta-
analyses of implicit bias that ignore psychological and social context are,
therefore, largely uninformative. Nevertheless, there is nothing inherent to
meta-analytic research that precludes coding for context, and meta-analyses
that do so find that correlations between implicit measures, explicit meas-
ures, and real-world behavior vary to a significant extent in keeping with
theory-based predictions.30
I have yet, however, to discuss the best evidence for indeterminism. The
thrust of the aforementioned studies might even seem to run in the other
direction. Psychologists claim that participants’ social-affective reactions
“imply” concrete evaluative judgments, most naturally expressed with state-
ments of (dis)liking. Of course, a mere association of “black” with “bad”
cannot, on its own, imply anything, because it lacks intentional content. So it
might seem that, to make sense of these claims, we have to grant that implicit
biases characteristically do have determinate content, with a canonical or
default articulation along the lines of, “I dislike members of group G.”31
Now, on my view, this sort of self-ascription of disliking may frequently be
among the more central, intuitive options for interpreting implicit bias, but
there are grounds for questioning whether it or anything else constitutes the
precise, canonical articulation. Why, in particular, should the dispositions at
issue be exclusively associated with (dis)liking rather than other forms of
affect or motivation? Consider, for example, the finding that antiblack im-
plicit bias did not correlate with any particular self-reported emotion toward
black people (whether fear, anger, guilt, etc.), but that it did correlate with the
<i>Race as Phenomena : Between Phenomenology and Philosophy of Race</i>, edited by Emily S. Lee, Rowman & Littlefield
         International, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unlv/detail.action?docID=5786544.
Created from unlv on 2019-07-30 12:34:51.
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 ©
 2
01
9.
 R
ow
m
an
 &
 L
itt
le
fie
ld
 In
te
rn
at
io
na
l. 
A
ll 
rig
ht
s 
re
se
rv
ed
.
Alex Madva96
average of all these negative emotions taken together.32 When implicitly
biased people report their racial attitudes, they are more likely to say some-
thing negative than something positive, but little beyond that is settled. Im-
plicit bias lacks a unique emotional signature and instead reflects a generic,
vague negativity. Evidence associating implicit bias with this sort of vague
negativity may be why open-ended dislike often seems a natural interpreta-
tion, but under certain conditions, this vague negativity can be channeled into
distinctive emotional reactions not best interpreted that way.
This brings us to the studies most suggestive of indeterminism. First,
participants completed an implicit measure of their spontaneous affective
reactions to images of white versus black faces. One group of participants
was then told that the gut feelings they may have had during the measure
reflected fear of blacks; another group was told that these feelings reflected
sympathy toward blacks. Participants were then asked to generate two or
three reasons why they might have felt fear or sympathy, respectively. Subse-
quently, those who both tested high in implicit bias and who were instructed
to interpret their feelings as fear now tended to agree with statements like
“Blacks are scary” and “Blacks are threatening.” However, implicitly biased
participants in the sympathy condition tended not to report explicit fear of
blacks. (Another study found the same pattern simply by measuring, rather
than manipulating, participants’ antecedent beliefs about whether their gut
feelings reflected fear versus sympathy.) Negative affect per se did not, just
as such, correlate with self-reported fear of African Americans, unless partic-
ipants noticed and interpreted their negative affect as fear and felt permitted
to say so.
As a phenomenologist, I interpret these studies as illustrating the open-
endedness, and pervasive potential for distortion, when we step back and
reflect on experience, switching gears from our habitual, “ready-to-hand”
mode of being-in-the-world to a more theoretical posture. These studies ex-
emplify the extent to which our unthematized social experience is up for
interpretive grabs. Compare Merleau-Ponty’s account of the transition from
indeterminacy to determinacy that results when reflective attention is di-
rected upon prereflective experience:
Attention, then, is neither an association of ideas nor the return to itself of a
thought that is already the master of its objects; rather, attention is the active
constitution of a new object that develops and thematizes what was until then
only offered as an indeterminate horizon. . . . The object only gives rise to the
“knowing event” that will transform it through the still ambiguous sense that it
offers to attention as needing-something-to-be-determined, such that the object
is the “motive” of and not the cause of this event. . . . This passage from the
indeterminate to the determinate, this continuous taking up again of its own
history in the unity of a new sense, is thought itself.33
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Unreflective Racial Bias 97
Specifically, these studies highlight the meaningful but indeterminate rela-
tions between our immediate affective dispositions and our concrete, articu-
lated emotions, and walk in lockstep with accounts of prereflective affectiv-
ity offered by phenomenologists. For example, citing Husserl and Merleau-
Ponty, Alia Al-Saji writes that “the realm of affectivity is wider than what
can be called emotion, since emotion is an intentional, sense-giving relation
(to an object) that is built on affect, whereas affect is the preintentional
tendency or force (attraction, repulsion, pain, pleasure, etc.) that can motivate
and support this intentional turning toward an object.”34 It is hard to imagine
a more apt description of how social psychologists are coming to understand
the relations between implicit affect, explicit prejudice, and discriminatory
behavior.
Moreover, the power of attention to make concrete meaning out of vague
feelings (or, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, to actively constitute new objects out
of indeterminate horizons) was not limited to swaying participants’ verbal
reports. Participants who interpreted their gut feelings as fear were, on a
subsequent task, more likely to perceive emotionally ambiguous black faces
as angry. This result recalls, but also contextualizes, the findings mentioned
above on implicit bias and the perception of emotion and race. Those results
suggested, at first glance, that implicit bias just as such influenced judgments
about ambiguous percepts, but the horizon of holistic interconnections is
evidently more complex: the effects of gut feelings on perceptual judgment
are (always already) mediated by self-interpretations of what those gut feel-
ings mean. Self-interpretation forms part of the background shaping the
meaning of implicit bias, which in turn forms part of the background shaping
the interpretation of perception.
FURTHER TAKEAWAYS
Constructionism, Existentialism, and the Bounded Horizons
of Interpretation
There are further notable findings and takeaways. First, although these stud-
ies indicate the wide horizon of possible implicit bias interpretations, they
simultaneously reveal that this horizon is bounded. Participants who were
instructed to interpret their gut feelings as sympathy were less likely to report
fear of blacks, but they were not, it turns out, more likely to report sympathy.
The experiment reduced self-reports of fear but did not increase self-reports
of sympathy. In this context, then, implicit biases were sufficiently flexible
as to be interpreted as either fear or not-fear, but not so completely up for
grabs as to be interpreted as any emotion whatsoever. This evidence of non-
trivial constraints on the range of feasible interpretations speaks against radi-
cally constructionist or existentialist approaches that would attribute unlimit-
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ed freedom to the mind’s self-interpreting and self-constituting powers. This
evidence, for example, qualifies the apparently radical constructionist impli-
cations of Schachter and Singer’s (1962) notorious (and notoriously difficult
to replicate) studies, which found that participants injected with adrenaline
reported profoundly different emotional experiences depending on available
contextual cues. We must disagree with the Hamlet- or Sartre-inspired inter-
locutor who would assert that “nothing’s [fear or sympathy] but thinking
makes it so.”
These findings resonate instead with a model of implicit (and explicit)
bias as indeterminate, interpretive horizon. As Alcoff claims about racial
identity and history, so it is with the content of implicit bias: “dynamic and
unstable, but its meanings are not completely indeterminate or infinitely
flexible, and they are not forged by any individual alone.”35 For a particular
individual experiencing a particular gut feeling, certain interpretations and
actions are more straightforwardly afforded by the context, while others are
off limits, with a gray border area in between.
Power, Situation, and Individual Bias
Social psychology also makes vivid how the passage of bias from indetermi-
nate to determinate is shaped by the broader situation, outside the individual.
In several studies, participants are (overtly or covertly) encouraged by au-
thority figures into conceiving of their gut feelings in particular ways, there-
by illustrating the intimate, self-interpretive depths to which power relations
can reach. (Interpretations of racial gut feelings are not forged by any indi-
vidual alone.) These studies thus recall the classic situationist experiments by
the likes of Milgram, Zimbardo, and Sherif, as further lessons in the power of
authority, norms, and the like.36 Typically, the authority figure in these ex-
periments is a scientist (and participants themselves tend to be psychology
majors, who are especially likely to value psychological research and defer to
psychologists’ summaries of what that research means). But there is no rea-
son to assume that scientists are alone in occupying positions of influence
over others’ interpretive horizons; parents, professors, politicians, and relig-
ious leaders presumably also share the power to shape how we interpret our
own minds. Authoritative others have the power to activate, legitimize, and
even mold our inchoate gut feelings, transforming vague feelings of social
discomfort into concrete emotional experiences of fear or indignation, and
indeterminate implicit biases into explicitly endorsed discrimination. It is not
just that authority figures “take advantage of” or “exploit” preexisting biases,
but that they play a significant role in making those biases what they are.
Yet even as these studies demonstrate the profound power of the situa-
tion, they simultaneously undermine the conventional situationist narrative,
according to which factors “external” to the individual are somehow more
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Unreflective Racial Bias 99
powerful drivers of behavior than factors “internal” (personality traits, moral
commitments, etc.). This approach to situational influence is foundationally
flawed, and these studies help explain why. For example, only those partici-
pants who tested high in implicit bias were influenced by the manipulations
telling them how to interpret their gut feelings. Participants who demonstrat-
ed little or no implicit bias were immune to demagogic testaments to the
validity of their negative feelings, for the obvious reason that they didn’t
have negative feelings to validate. Implicit biases thus constitute an impor-
tant individual-difference variable, determining whether and how situational
factors shape thought and action. Numerous other personal beliefs and traits
also have decisive roles to play. For example, telling (implicitly biased)
participants that their gut feelings represent their “real” attitudes and “genu-
ine” selves can also lead them to report explicit prejudice and support for
discriminatory policies;37 however, this manipulation primarily affects only
those (implicitly biased) participants who are also high in self-esteem, that is,
those antecedently disposed to have positive views of their “selves.” Thus,
although studies like this are clearly reminiscent of classic situationist find-
ings, they also represent a decisive departure from the narratives passed
down about those findings. The core contrast between person and situation,
or in sociological contexts between agency and structure, is confused. Situa-
tions do not operate by themselves to shape self-interpretation and action, but
only in conjunction with individuals’ other (potentially idiosyncratic) atti-
tudes, habits, traits, experiences—and implicit biases. The power of situa-
tions depends, fundamentally, on the minds of those in them.
In a final exemplification of indeterminacy, some studies even find that,
in the right metacognitive context, implicit biases become cues to act virtu-
ously.38 Specifically, individuals who feel acutely aware and even guilty
about their biased feelings, but who are earnestly committed to being unprej-
udiced, can effectively learn to reinterpret those feelings, not as invitations to
be biased, but as palpable, internal signals to be just. Such findings speak to
strategies for ameliorating injustice, which I explore more fully elsewhere. 39
Notably, for example, when diversity trainers stress that the “vast majority of
people” harbor implicit biases, trainees become more biased, but when train-
ers stress that the “vast majority of people try to overcome” their implicit
biases, trainees became less biased.40 Collectively telling ourselves that our
biases are inaccurate, unintentional, unrepresentative of our underlying com-
mitments, and ultimately to be overcome, may be key to discouraging the
implicit from bubbling up into the explicit and motivating us to unlearn our
biases altogether.
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OBJECTIONS AND ALTERNATIVE VIEWS
Epistemicism
I take such findings to reveal the profound indeterminacy inherent in our
implicit biases. An alternative interpretation is that individuals simply don’t
know what the contents of their attitudes are.41 This alternative locates the
problem in epistemology rather than metaphysics, concluding that introspec-
tive access to implicit bias is limited, and corresponds to Williamson’s “epis-
temicist” take on vagueness, which argues that apparent borderline cases
(e.g., between being bald and having hair) are actually determinate; we just
don’t, perhaps can’t, know whether they are one way or the other.42 There is,
on this line of thinking, a fact of the matter about whether implicitly biased
individuals do or don’t fear black people, but they (and we) may not know
either way.
Let me first note my agreement that these studies highlight various obsta-
cles to self-knowledge. A central theme of the phenomenological tradition,
after all, is that mental life is not transparent to introspection. “Nothing is
more difficult,” Merleau-Ponty writes, “than knowing precisely what we
see.”43 My view is that many of us fail to know that the contents of our racial
attitudes are indeterminate and context sensitive. This is not because our
attitudes are unconscious, only difficult to interpret. It is, however, unclear
what empirical evidence or metaphysical ur-facts could settle that our biases
have one precise content rather than another. If we take a broadly functional-
ist approach to individuating mental content (and what other approach is
there?), then their content is manifestly underspecified. Can we appeal to
self-report, and attribute beliefs based on people’s sincere assertions? Not
when the relations between implicit bias and sincere assertion are, to put it
mildly, a big mess. The same is true if we look beyond self-report, for
example to prereflective nonverbal behavior or perceptual judgment. White
people with antiblack implicit biases are not, simply thereby, more likely to
see black faces as angry; they must also interpret their bias as fear. So I am
skeptical that there are pure, determinate facts about the content of implicit
bias, which we then fail to know. What we can know is that this bias in this
mind in this body in this environment is, say, fear of African Americans. But
once we appreciate that each potential context plays a key role in shaping the
meaning of our racial attitudes, then we should acknowledge that there is no
neutral context that could, even in principle, reveal those attitudes in some
unalloyed form.
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Disjunctivism
Emphasizing the context-specificity of implicit bias, however, suggests an-
other interpretation: disjunctivism. On this line (which is compatible with
epistemicism), giving a full accounting of a given individual’s attitudes to-
ward blacks might require us to say that they feel fear-in-context-C but
sympathy-in-context-D, and so on. This individual might not generally fear
black people—suppose, for example, he reliably marches and votes against
policies that criminalize denizens of the black ghetto—but he does (determi-
nately) fear tall dark-skinned men wearing hoodies when walking alone at
night. Disjunctivism rests satisfied with a mere listing of all these context-
indexed dispositions and denies that there is anything substantive to say
about his racial attitudes that remains true across contexts.
As with epistemicism, I have some sympathies with disjunctivism. I be-
lieve our racial attitudes (often) become determinate once embedded in con-
text, so a sufficiently long and complex disjunction could perhaps describe
an individual’s overall dispositional profile. But would this disjunction con-
stitute the most accurate and perspicuous way to represent the contents of his
racial attitudes? I doubt it. First, since disjunctivism refuses to say anything
about what underlies or unifies the individual’s diverse race-related disposi-
tions, it seems tantamount to abandoning an explanatory or illuminating ac-
count of racial bias altogether. Second, since the full disjunction may well be
infinitely long, the disjunctivist tack makes even the descriptive project of
capturing the phenomenology and psychology of racial bias come to seem
hopeless. Disjunctivism is, then, not just compatible with, but may in fact
entail, epistemicism. There are indefinitely many unknown and perhaps even
unknowable contexts that could shape and be shaped by our implicit biases,
making the true contents of those biases in principle unknowable as well. So
it seems preferable to sum up individuals’ racial attitudes with an admirably
short and sweet, but regrettably vague and open-ended content (namely, that
they are implicitly biased!), with the understanding that this vagueness will
often be determinately resolved in specific cases.
That disjunctivism devolves into quietism and ignorance about both self
and other may seem either a virtue or a vice, depending on one’s other
philosophical leanings. My grounds for preferring indeterminism are also
practical and similar in spirit to Haslanger’s critical-theoretical approach to
race and gender, which asks which metaphysical views of these categories
best serve our political aims.44 Similarly, we might ask how best to conceptu-
alize implicit bias for the purpose of resisting injustice. Which view is most
useful, whether for generating new empirical research, or for motivating
social change? Both epistemicism and disjunctivism seem to me to make the
role for individual and collective responsibility obscure. How can we take
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responsibility for our biases if we can’t know what they are, or if what we do
in one context is wholly irrelevant to what we do in another?
My hunch is that with great indeterminacy comes great responsibility.
Indeterminism makes salient that the biases we harbor hold the potential to
guide us toward both just and unjust action—depending on our other habits,
beliefs, and values, and the contexts in which we find ourselves. As Emily
Lee writes, “why value openness and ambiguity? Open and ambiguous
knowledge permits the possibility of becoming and change.”45 So it is with
indeterminism about implicit bias, which brings into sharpest relief the po-
tential for change, both for better and for worse. Each of us is individually
responsible for interpreting, reining in, and ultimately eradicating our implic-
it biases, as well as for holding others accountable for doing the same. We
are, moreover, collectively responsible for structuring social environments
that, among other things, encourage more accurate and virtuous self-interpre-
tations and discourage vicious ones.
But if I have convinced you of nothing else, I hope it is at least clear that
the received aversive racism narrative, which portrays most Americans as
unambiguously antiracist on the explicit level and irredeemably biased on the
implicit level, is due for a rewrite. Our conscious egalitarianism is far more
fragile and subject to contextual variation than commonly appreciated (or at
least than was appreciated until about June 2015), and our implicit biases are
also up for contextual grabs. Are these social gut feelings conscious or un-
conscious, reflectively endorsed or disavowed, representative of our real
selves or alien implantations by external cultural forces? Are we afraid of the
racial other or just afraid of appearing racist? Depending on context, the
answer can be any or none of the above. We must own up to as much, and in
particular own up to disowning our biases.46
NOTES
1. See Pearson, Dovidio, and Gaertner, “Nature of Contemporary Prejudice.”
2. This chapter focuses on the spontaneous reactions driving performance on measures like
the IAT. Yet our minds are populated with an array of arguably “implicit” cognitive structures
that contribute to discrimination but may evade detection on IATs. See Del Pinal, Madva, and
Reuter, “Stereotypes, Conceptual Centrality and Gender Bias.”
3. Madva, “Implicit Bias, Moods, and Moral Responsibility.”
4. Weiss, “Sedimented Attitudes and Existential Responsibilities,” 97 n. 14; see also 93,
99–100 n. 43.
5. Alcoff, “Sotomayor’s Reasoning,” 130 n. 17.
6. Glaser and Knowles, “Implicit Motivation to Control Prejudice.”
7. Hehman, Flake, and Calanchini, “Disproportionate Use of Lethal Force in Policing.”
8. On implicit bias and criminal justice, see Cholbi and Madva, “Black Lives Matter and
the Call for Death Penalty Abolition,” sec. II.
9. See also Brownstein and Madva, “Normativity of Automaticity.”
10. Eric Schwitzgebel defends another kind of indeterminacy in Americans’ racial attitudes,
such that aversive racists neither believe nor fail to believe that all races should be treated
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equally, in “Acting Contrary to Our Professed Beliefs.” I argue that the very contents of our
racial attitudes are indeterminate, although much of the evidence to follow may be amenable to
Schwitzgebel’s analysis also.
11. Alcoff, Future of Whiteness, 74–90; Madva, “Plea for Anti-anti-individualism.”
12. E.g., Ngo, “Racist Habits,” 854.
13. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 7, 12.
14. Romdenh-Romluc, Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Merleau-Ponty, 18.
15. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 222.
16. Drews, Pasupathi, and Strayer, “Passenger and Cell Phone Conversations in Simulated
Driving.”
17. Hugenberg and Bodenhausen, “Facing Prejudice” and “Ambiguity in Social Categoriza-
tion.” In future work, I plan to discuss numerous subsequent studies finding similar patterns.
18. Levinson and Young, “Different Shades of Bias.”
19. Husserl, Experience and Judgment, sec. 8.
20. Alcoff, Visible Identities, 95.
21. Ibid., 179.
22. Lee, Lindquist, and Payne, “Constructing Bias,” 4; emphasis added.
23. Cone, Mann, and Ferguson, “Changing Our Implicit Minds.”
24. Oswald et al., “Predicting Ethnic and Racial Discrimination.”
25. Gawronski and Bodenhausen, “Associative and Propositional Processes in Evaluation.”
26. Dunham, Baron, and Banaji, “Development of Implicit Intergroup Cognition.”
27. Gawronski et al., “Understanding the Relations between Different Forms of Racial
Prejudice,” 650.
28. Ranganath, Smith, and Nosek, “Distinguishing Automatic and Controlled Components
of Attitudes.”
29. Brownstein, Madva, and Gawronski, “Understanding Implicit Bias.”
30. Cameron, Brown-Iannuzzi, and Payne, “Sequential Priming Measures of Implicit Social
Cognition.”
31. This account of the inferential relations between spontaneous affective reactions and
propositional judgments is puzzling, given that these theorists also argue that implicit biases are
stored as mere contentless associations (e.g., Gawronski et al., “Understanding the Relations
between Different Forms of Racial Prejudice,” 650, 660). How can a mere association “lead to”
a gut feeling that in turn “implies” anything unless the original association also has intentional
content? Are social psychologists running afoul of the “Myth of the Given”? Thanks to Gabby
Johnson for discussion here, which I hope to address in future research.
32. Lee, Lindquist, and Payne, “Constructing Bias.”
33. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 55.
34. Al-Saji, “Phenomenology of Hesitation,” 162 n. 2.
35. Alcoff, Visible Identities, 115.
36. I had hoped to say more here about implicit bias, norms, and hermeneutical injustice, but
space limitations require deferring that discussion to future work.
37. Cooley et al., “Who Owns Implicit Attitudes?”
38. Burns, Monteith, and Parker, “Training Away Bias.”
39. Madva, “Virtue, Social Knowledge, and Implicit Bias”; Madva, “Biased against Debias-
ing”; Madva, “Inevitability of Aiming for Virtue.”
40. Duguid and Thomas-Hunt, “Condoning Stereotyping?”
41. Thanks to Andreja Novakovic for discussion.
42. Williamson, Vagueness.
43. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 59.
44. Haslanger, Resisting Reality.
45. Lee, “Towards a Lived Understanding of Race and Sex,” 85.
46. For insightful feedback, I am grateful to Michael Cholbi, Peter Ross, and especially
Emily Lee, as well as to audiences at Washington University’s “Psychology of Prejudice”
workshop (November 2017), Wake Forest University (April 2018), and Cal Poly Pomona’s
“brown bag” workshop (April 2018).
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